Who said what? The effects of source cues in issue frames by Hartman, T.K. & Weber, C.R.
	



	



	

	
				


 	!∀#∃∀%&∋(()
	∗	


!+
	,
∀−./..01223−./440
		5

6−(−((−−−(/((/(00/7
∃	
∃	26
		5

6−(−((−−−(/((/(00/7





	8	

				

WHO SAID WHAT? 
 
1
Running Head: WHO SAID WHAT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Who Said What? The Effects of Source Cues in Issue Frames* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Todd K. Hartman 
Department of Government and Justice Studies 
Appalachian State University 
Boone, NC 28607 
hartmantk@appstate.edu 
 
& 
 
Christopher R. Weber 
Department of Political Science 
Manship School of Mass Communication 
Louisiana State University 
217 Stubbs Hall 
Baton Rouge, LA 70803 
crweber@lsu.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Article Forthcoming in Political Behavior.
WHO SAID WHAT? 
 
2
 
Abstract 
 
Drawing on previous research concerning the role that source cues play in political information 
processing, we examine whether an ideological identity match between the source of a framed 
message and the respondent moderates framing effects. We test our hypotheses in two experiments 
concerning attitudes toward a proposed rally by the Ku Klux Klan. In Experiment 1 (N = 274), we 
test our hypothesis in a simple issue framing experiment. We find that framing effects occur for 
strong identifiers only when there is a match between the ideology of the speaker and respondent. In 
Experiment 2 (N = 259), we examine whether matched frames resonate equally well when 
individuals are simultaneously exposed to competing frames. The results from this experiment 
provide mixed support for our hypotheses. The results from our studies suggest that identity 
matching is an important factor to consider in future framing research.
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Who Said What? The Effects of Source Cues in Issue Frames 
 Over the past two decades, public opinion scholars have accumulated strong evidence of 
framing effects for a wide range of social and political issues (Gamson, 1992; Gamson and 
Mogdigliani, 1987; Iyengar, 1991; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Nelson and 
Kinder, 1996; Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley, 1997; Schuman and Presser, 1981). Consistent evidence 
has demonstrated that subtle differences in the presentation of information can influence how 
people form and change their political attitudes (for an excellent summary, see Druckman, 2004, as 
well as Chong and Druckman, 2007a). This research has led some scholars to revisit models of 
information processing and conclude that citizens do not possess concrete attitudes, per se; rather, 
they construct opinions based upon whatever information is accessible at the time (Zaller and 
Feldman, 1992). This “top-of-the-head” approach suggests that characteristics of the sender, 
receiver, and message interact to produce attitude formation and change (Zaller, 1992). In this paper, 
we extend this line of inquiry by considering the role of social influence in political communication. 
Specifically, we explore whether ideological identities of the message source and recipient affect 
susceptibility to issue frames. 
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
Scholars have traditionally defined framing as the process by which potentially relevant 
considerations are made available, which, in turn, influence how an individual thinks about an issue 
(Nelson et al., 1997). A framing effect occurs when the considerations highlighted in a frame move 
people to endorse or oppose a specific policy (Gamson, 1992). A frame is said to be effective when 
it shifts an opinion distribution in a particular direction. For example, individuals exposed to a 
freedom of speech frame are more likely to allow a disliked group to demonstrate in public, while 
those that received a public safety and order frame are quick to restrict the groups’ first-amendment 
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rights (Nelson et al., 1997). Chong and Druckman (2007a) note that a "major premise of framing 
theory is that an issue can be viewed from a variety of perspectives and be construed as having 
implications for multiple values or considerations" (p. 104). 
Framing effects have been documented in diverse contexts such as attitudes towards 
unpopular social groups (Chong, 1993; Nelson et al., 1997; Nelson and Kinder, 1996; Schuman and 
Presser, 1981), welfare (Brewer, 2001), campaign finance reform (Druckman and Nelson, 2003), and 
moral issues (Feldman and Weber, 2008.). Indeed, issue framing is so ubiquitous that public opinion 
can often be gauged based upon the frames used by elites. This has led many scholars to focus 
almost exclusively on how the media and elites present political issues, assuming a priori that public 
opinion will follow suit (Chong and Druckman, 2007a).  
However, second-generation framing research has increasingly focused on instances of when 
framing does (or does not) occur (Brewer, 2003, 2005; Chong and Druckman, 2007b; Druckman, 
2001a, 2001b, 2004; Druckman and Nelson, 2003; Sniderman and Theriault, 2004). For example, 
scholars find that framing effects are attenuated when individuals are immersed in heterogeneous, 
cross-cutting social networks (Druckman and Nelson, 2003) or when the media outlet carrying a 
message is viewed as untrustworthy (e.g., The National Enquirer; Druckman, 2001a). Recent work 
has also demonstrated that multifaceted information environments reduce framing effects in what 
has been called dual or competitive framing (Brewer, 2003, 2005; Chong and Druckman, 2007b; 
Druckman, 2001a, 2004; Druckman and Nelson, 2003; Sniderman and Theriault, 2004; see also 
Zaller, 1992). Evidence has also suggested that individual-level political and psychological factors 
influence framing, such as motivation (Druckman and Nelson, 2003) and ability (Brewer, 2003). 
Only recently have political scientists started to explore how social factors influence issue 
framing (for a review, see Chong and Druckman, 2007a). Distal factors – social context, message 
source, competitive positions, and individual-level motivational variables - increasingly play a role in 
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this research. In this paper, we explore an empirically overlooked aspect of issue framing: Whether 
identification with the source of a message moderates framing effects. 
 
Framing and Social Context 
We start with the observation that political information is rarely reported without some type 
of source information (Druckman, 2001b; McGuire, 1969; Zaller, 1992). Consider the heated 
debates about immigration leading up to the midterm elections in 2006. News coverage discussed 
the core issues at stake, as well as reported the positions, via direct statements or indirect 
attributions, of the political groups involved (e.g., Democrats vs. Republicans; liberals vs. 
conservatives, etc.). Source information placed the debate within a larger political context, and 
simply knowing where like-minded individuals stood on the issue was likely integral to opinion 
formation. 
We examine the importance of source cues in two settings. First, we test the role of cues 
when the information flow is asymmetric. Next, we create an environment in which information is 
presented competitively—that is, participants are offered competing issue positions from different 
sources. We draw heavily from theories of social influence and explore how the likeability of a 
message source affects asymmetric and competitive framing environments.  
Social psychological research has demonstrated the importance of source cues in attitude 
formation and change (Kelman, 1958; French, 1956; French and Raven, 1959). Much of this 
literature has found that source information can be arrayed on several qualitatively different 
dimensions: Power, credibility, and identification (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; Kelman, 1958, 1961; 
Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, 1948; McGuire, 1969; Zaller, 1992). The distinction between these 
three forms of social influence is empirically important, as each of them influences attitude change 
for different reasons and to varying degrees. For instance, adjusting one’s attitude to appease an 
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authority figure is a qualitatively different process than changing one’s beliefs to maintain an 
ongoing relationship—the former results in less stable beliefs, the latter in more durable beliefs. For 
example, Kelman (1958) finds that conformity due to power differences leads to compliance, and 
individuals maintain a given belief insofar as an authority figure is present or is perceived to be 
surveying the situation (Bond and Smith, 1996; Milgram, 1974; Zimbardo, 2007; for a review, see 
Cialdini, 1984). 
Credibility induced conformity refers to the objective or subjectively perceived expertise of 
the source—a credible source is generally rated as more trustworthy, persuasive, and convincing 
(Eagly and Chaiken, 1993). In an issue framing experiment, Druckman (2001a) demonstrated 
framing effects were attenuated when the source of the message was viewed as untrustworthy (e.g., 
The National Enquirer) but enhanced when the message was perceived as credible (e.g., The New 
York Times). Credibility exerts its strongest influence when the participant’s motivation is on 
forming accurate opinions (Kelman, 1961). 
A third, and less explored, dimension is the degree of identification with the source. 
Identification-produced conformity leads one to adopt a position to maintain an identity, and so 
long as an identity is salient, the belief will be maintained. Whereas credibility hinges on source 
expertise, identification stems from the desire to maintain a positive self- image and identity within a 
particular group. Indeed, the social groups that one belongs to often serve as an important source of 
information regarding the values one holds (Conover and Feldman, 1984; Hooghe and Marks, 2004; 
Huddy, 2001; Shamir and Arian, 2000; Sniderman et al., 2003; Tate, 2003). Simply knowing how a 
fellow partisan stands on a political issue is often sufficient in forming a belief. For example, Tomz 
and Sniderman (n.d.) find that using political brand names (party or ideological labels) dramatically 
increases the level of issue constraint across and within domains (irrespective of an individual's 
political knowledge). Moreover, the position of one’s group aids in explaining why individuals may 
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hold logically contradictory beliefs—for instance, a conservative’s endorsement of the death penalty 
but opposition to abortion; or a liberal’s position that abortion is a woman’s fundamental right but 
that the death penalty is murder; or why conservatives generally favor more government spending in 
the case of national defense but less for domestic issues, and vice-versa for liberals (Cohen, 2003; for 
an interesting interpretation of these contradictions, see Lakoff, 2003). The very assumption that 
one’s group holds similar moral-commitments is often a potent indicator of political beliefs.  As 
noted by Cohen (2003) “social meaning is not inferred but transferred [and] it is defined by the 
judgments of other individuals who are trusted to share one’s moral allegiances—that is, individuals 
who share one’s social identity” (p.809).  
Since much of the extant work in political science has focused on how elites and experts 
shape opinion, it remains an unanswered question as to whether people’s identification with the 
message source facilitates political persuasion, in general, and framing, in particular. It is reasonable 
that issue frames imbued with partisan cues may not moderate framing effects. This is because 
psychological process underlying issue framing has been shown to result from greater importance 
attached to a given set of considerations (cf., Slothuus, 2008). Usually, the considerations drawn 
upon in issue frames are familiar, such as a set of core values common to the given political culture 
(McClosky and Zaller, 1982). For this reason, it is conceivable that the values themselves could 
overshadow the effects of any identity-relevant cues (Nelson and Garst, 2007). 
Yet, empirical work has also suggested that identity cues affect persuasion. For instance, 
Zaller (1992) notes that partisan predispositions often indicate how citizens consider political issues, 
and cues offered by elites can be so powerful that they often define the political debate (see also 
Brewer, 2005). Mondak (1993) similarly finds that source cues are frequently used as a heuristic in 
political evaluation, and Druckman (2001b) demonstrates that for equivalency framing the partisan 
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source of the message moderates the intensity of framing effects.1 Here, framing effects were 
reduced for Democrats who evaluated a Republican program and vice versa. 
 Because of these competing possibilities surrounding the effects of source cues in issue 
frames, we sought to examine the role of ideological identification in this process. While there are 
many identities we could have explored – such as party attachments, race, gender, and so on – we 
opted to use ideological labels, since they are used so often in debates about political issues. 
Moreover, we wanted to demonstrate that ideological identification can serve as an important source 
of information in political communication. Note that this implies we view ideology in these studies 
as a symbolic group label - an identity (Conover and Feldman, 1981) – rather than solely as indicator 
of issue consistency or a constellation of values and beliefs (Converse, 1964). 
We explore the role of source identification in two experiments: One in which asymmetric 
frames were presented and only one source was offered to each subject; the second where dual, 
competing frames were used. In these two experiments, we test an assimilation hypothesis, which states 
that the stronger an individual identifies with a message source, the more likely that individual will demonstrate 
framing effects (and vice versa). In other words, we expect that an identity match between the source and 
respondent’s ideology will heighten framing effects, while an ideological mismatch will attenuate 
such effects. The asymmetric framing experiment highlighted a single value: Whether the Ku Klux 
Klan should be allowed to march on campus because of free speech or public order considerations. 
The competitive framing experiment drew on both values: While some feel the KKK should be able 
to march and exercise their first amendment rights, others feel that the KKK are a threat to public 
order and safety. What is more, we examine the role of identification by varying the position taken 
by liberals and conservatives. 
                                                 
1
 Druckman (2001b) distinguishes between two types of framing: Equivalency frames and expectancy (i.e., issue) frames. 
The former refers to logically equivalent frames, used, for example, in the progeny of experiments measuring risk-averse 
and risk-seeking behavior, whereas the latter refers to messages that invoke a subset of considerations, often commonly 
held values, which affect how citizens consider political issues (Zaller, 1992). 
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Experimental Design 
Data 
A total of 533 undergraduate students from Stony Brook University participated in our 
studies for extra credit during the 2005-2006 academic school year (Experiment 1: N = 274; 
Experiment 2: N = 259). Of this total, 56% of subjects were male and 44% were female. Forty-six 
percent of subjects identified their race as “White,” 23% as “Asian,” 10% as “African-American,” 
7% as “Hispanic or Latino,” and 13% chose to identify themselves as “Other.” The majority—
roughly 63%—of participants stated that they generally considered themselves to be Democrats, 
with 20% listed as Republicans and 17% as non-leaning Independents.2 
 
Procedure and Measures 
We designed two experiments to test the extent to which source cues moderate framing 
effects. In Experiment 1, we examined the impact of source cues in asymmetric, or one-sided, 
information flows. Participants read a fictitious newspaper article about the KKK's recent petition to 
hold a rally on campus (see the Appendix for the exact wording). Subjects were randomly assigned 
to one of four experimental conditions formed by a simple 2 (value frame: free speech vs. public 
order) x 2 (source ideology: liberal vs. conservative) between-subjects design. We coded these factors 
as dummy variables so that value frame is 1 for the public order frame and 0 for the free speech 
frame, and source ideological identity is 1 for a conservative speaker and 0 for a liberal speaker.  
In Experiment 2, we tested the importance of source cues in symmetric, or two-sided, 
information environments. Once again, participants read the fictitious article about the KKK's 
recent petition to hold a rally on campus. This time, however, participants were exposed to both of 
                                                 
2 Two subjects refused to identify their gender, and 5 subjects did not answer the race or party identification questions. 
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the free speech and public order frames, and we varied the ideological source that endorsed each 
particular frame. In other words, participants either received a free speech frame from a liberal 
source and a public order frame from a conservative speaker, or vice versa. We expected that the 
relative weights attached to the free speech and public order frames would be a function of the 
positions taken by the ideologically congruent source.  
Before reading the experimental materials, subjects rated their feelings toward a number of 
different groups (e.g., Blacks, Whites, homosexuals, Christian fundamentalists, etc.) on 9-point 
scales. We used their responses to two key groups—liberals and conservatives—to create a measure 
of ideological identification, since these items asked respondents to judge how “warm or favorable” 
they felt to each of the two groups. We subtracted each subject’s feelings toward liberals from their 
feelings toward conservatives and then rescaled this variable from 0 to 1, where higher scores 
indicate warmer feelings toward conservatives. We use feeling thermometers – rather than 
ideological self-placement – because research in social psychology has demonstrated that 
identification is manifest in one’s degree of liking or disliking the source. It is important to note that 
all our substantive findings are nearly identical when we use a self-placement measure of ideology. 
The resulting identification measure was then mean-centered (see Aiken and West, 1991; Jaccard and 
Turrisi, 2003). Throughout our analysis, we also control for a number of demographic variables: 
Gender (males serve as the baseline category), party identification (measured on a 7-point scale and 
rescaled from 0 to 1, where high scores indicate strong Republican identifiers), race (Whites serve as 
the baseline). Our results are substantively identical if we exclude these controls, but by controlling 
for them, we obtain a better estimate of framing effects. 
After exposure to the framing manipulation, we asked respondents to answer several 
questions that serve as our dependent variables. First, subjects indicated their level of support for 
the proposed KKK rally on campus by answering the following question: “Do you think Stony 
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Brook University should or should not allow the Ku Klux Klan to hold a rally on this campus?” 
Responses to this attitude item ranged from 1 (“Definitely Should be Allowed”) to 9 (“Definitely 
Should NOT be Allowed”). We recoded this dependent variable from 0 to 1, where high scores 
indicate greater support for the rally. In some ways, support for the rally could be thought of a 
measure of context-specific tolerance. 
We also measured each respondent’s general tolerance by creating a scale of 3 items concerning 
the extension of rights to disliked groups (Experiment 1: KR-20 = 0.65; Experiment 2: KR-20 = 
0.54). For example, participants had to choose whether to allow disliked groups, such as the Neo-
Nazis, to appear on public television. We combined these 3 items to create a 4-point scale that we 
recoded from 0 to 1, where high scores indicate greater levels of general tolerance. 
 
Results 
Experiment 1: One-Sided Information Flows 
To test our assimilation hypothesis—that an identity match between message source and 
recipient moderates framing effects—we regressed support for the KKK rally on the frame X source 
ideology X ideological identification three-way interaction, along with all of its constituent terms and a set 
of control variables (see Table 1).3 Looking at the results in Table 1, we find initial support for our 
assimilation hypothesis with a statistically significant 3-way interaction (B = -0.94, SE = 0.39, p < 
0.05). To further explicate this interaction, we calculated mean values of the frame X source ideology 2-
way interaction at theoretically interesting levels of the ideological identification moderator variable 
                                                 
3 We also conducted a series of analyses with the standard 7-point NES ideology item in place of our differenced 
ideological identification measure and found the same statistically significant 3-way interaction presented in Table 1 (B = 
-0.78, SE = 0.36, p < 0.05). For subjects in the liberal matching condition, we found a statistically significant slope for 
frame, B = -0.22, SE = 0.11, p<0.05; for conservatives this matching effect was even more pronounced, B = -0.43, SE = 
0.17, p<0.01. For strong identifiers in the mismatched conditions, there were no framing effects: A conservative source 
paired with liberal identifiers, B = 0.04, SE = 0.11, n.s.; a liberal source paired with conservative identifiers, B = 0.08, SE 
= 0.16, n.s. 
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(see Aiken and West, 1991; Jaccard and Turrisi, 2003 for a full methodological discussion). We 
present these 2 X 2 tables in Table 2. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
When there is an ideological match between the source of the framed message and the 
recipient, we find a strong assimilation effect. For instance, when the message source is liberal and 
the recipient strongly identifies with liberals, individuals exposed to the free speech frame were 
much more likely to support the KKK’s request to rally than those exposed to the public order 
frame (MeanFree Speech = 0.48, SEFree Speech= 0.09; MeanPublic Order = 0.20, SEPublic Order= 0.11; t = 2.17, 
p<0.05). Likewise, when the source is conservative and the recipient identifies strongly with 
conservatives, we once again find an assimilation effect (MeanFree Speech = 0.75, SEFree Speech= 0.12; 
MeanPublic Order = 0.31, SEPublic Order= 0.14; t = 2.67, p<0.01). In fact, the mean difference for 
conservatives is quite large – a full 0.45 points on a scale ranging from 0 to 1. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
In contrast, when there is an ideological mismatch between message source and recipient, we 
find no evidence of framing effects. Liberal identifiers exposed to the frames from the conservative 
source were no more likely to grant procedural protections to the KKK when presented with the 
free-speech relative to public-order frame (MeanFree Speech = 0.36, SEFree Speech= 0.10; MeanPublic Order = 
0.43, SEPublic Order= 0.11; t = 0.54, n.s.). Similarly, conservative identifiers showed no assimilation 
effect when exposed to frames from a mismatched, liberal source (MeanFree Speech = 0.49, SEFree Speech= 
0.14; MeanPublic Order = 0.65, SEPublic Order= 0.14; t = 0.86, n.s.). 
Interestingly, subjects at the mean level of ideological identification—that is, those 
individuals who neither identified strongly with liberals nor conservatives—showed a small framing 
effect regardless of the source. When presented with the value frames from the liberal speaker, non-
identifiers showed a 0.10 point mean difference in levels of support (MeanFree Speech = 0.48, SEFree 
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Speech= 0.05; MeanPublic Order = 0.38, SEPublic Order= 0.05; t = 1.70, p<0.10). And, when non-identifiers 
were exposed to messages from the conservative source, a similar 0.12 point framing effect was 
discovered (MeanFree Speech = 0.52, SEFree Speech= 0.05; MeanPublic Order = 0.38, SEPublic Order= 0.05; t = 2.44, 
p<0.05). As one might intuitively expect, subjects who do not strongly identify with liberals or 
conservatives appear to ignore or discount the ideological source information. This particular 
finding fits well with existing research on source cues (Kelman, 1958; Zaller, 1992). The mean levels 
of support for the frame X source interactions at levels of the identifier moderator variable are also 
presented in Figure 1.4 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
In addition to the moderated effects of attitudes toward the KKK rally, we also find similar 
results when we examine measures of general tolerance. Since the categorical nature of our general 
tolerance dependent variable—only 4 points—violates the assumptions underlying standard 
regression procedures, we used an ordered logit (with all of the constituent terms and lower-order 
interactions) to test our identity matching hypothesis (Brambor, Clark, and Golder, 2005). As with 
the specific measure of support for the KKK rally, we also find evidence that the value frames alter 
levels of general political tolerance (frame X source X identification interaction: B = -6.22, SE = 2.17, 
p<0.01).5 The results from this model are included in Table 3. As the coefficients from this ordered 
logit are not directly interpretable, we generated predicted values (for being very tolerant) and 
plotted them in Figure 2. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
The results for the general tolerance dependent variable parallel our earlier findings. If 
subjects identify strongly with the message source, they assimilate the specific value frame into their 
                                                 
4 Not surprisingly, we also find a main effect for all non-white subjects, such that they were less supportive (and tolerant) 
of the KKK rally. 
5 This 3-way interaction holds when we use the 7-point NES ideology item as a measure of ideological identification: 
frame X source X identification, B = -5.04, SE=1.99, p<0.01). 
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attitudes toward general tolerance. For example, when the message is delivered by a liberal and the 
participant strongly identifies with liberals, the probability of expressing tolerance is significantly 
greater following exposure to the free speech frame (0.51) versus public order frame (0.26), Ƣ = -
1.18, SE = 0.68, p<0.10 (see Jaccard, 2001 for a methodological discussion of interpreting 
interaction effects in logistic regression models). This pattern is even more pronounced for strong 
conservatives identifiers exposed to a message from a conservative source—the probability of being 
very tolerant is significantly greater following free speech (0.66) than public order (0.14), B = -2.72, 
SE = 0.94, p<0.01. Once again, we find no framing effects for attitudes toward general tolerance 
when the message comes from an uncongenial source. When the message comes from a 
conservative source and is received by a liberal identifier, there is a statistically significant rejection of 
the frame, such that it creates a contrast effect of the specific value frame (i.e., the frame has the 
opposite intended effect; B = 1.30, SE = 0.69, p<0.10. When the reverse is true—that is, when a 
liberal source presents frames to a strong conservative identifier, we find no evidence of framing 
effects (B = 1.01, SE = 1.02, n.s.). Unlike before, we find no general tolerance framing effects for 
our subjects that are ideologically unidentified. In sum, these results confirm our assimilation 
expectation that an ideological match facilitates framing effects. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Since the ideological match between message source and recipient appears to override the 
main framing effect of considerations in the message, we sought to examine the process by which 
this occurs. In accordance with previous work suggesting that framing is driven by the relative 
weight attached to certain values addressed in the frame – rather than altering the core basis of one’s 
beliefs – we sought to examine whether the ideological matching effect is mediated by the 
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importance attached to free-speech and public-order values. To examine this mediated-moderation, 6 we 
first reproduced the significant frame X source X ideological identification interaction for attitudes toward 
the KKK rally, B = -0.94, SE = 0.39, p < 0.05.7 
Next, we regressed each of the two value importance dependent variables (i.e., free speech 
and public order) on the key 3-way interaction, as well as all of the lower order terms and control 
variables (see Columns A and C of Table 4). This analysis yielded a statistically significant frame X 
source X ideological identification interaction for public order values (B = 0.50, SE = 0.24, p<0.05) but 
not for free speech values (B = 0.08, SE = 0.37, n.s.).8 A closer inspection of the interaction for 
public order values reveals that the matching effect is driven largely by our conservative identifiers, 
who demonstrated a 0.27 point difference (on a scale from 0 to 1) in mean public order importance 
ratings when exposed to the public order frame relative to the free speech frame by a conservative 
source (B = 0.27, SE = 0.10, p<0.01). 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Finally, we regressed support for the KKK rally on each of the value importance measures, 
the critical 3-way interaction, and all of the lower order terms and control variables.9 As evidenced in 
Columns B and D of Table 4, the value importance ratings significantly predict support for the rally. 
First, moving from the lowest to highest ratings of free speech values increases support for the 
KKK rally by 0.32 on a scale from 0 to 1. In contrast, a one unit change in ratings of public order 
values decreases support for the rally by 0.67, which is more than two-thirds of the entire scale. 
More importantly, public order value importance ratings mediate our frame x source x ideological 
                                                 
6 According to Baron & Kenny (1986), mediated-moderation is tested as follows: (a) The dependent variable must be 
significantly predicted by the independent variable in the absence of the mediator variable, (b) the mediator must be 
significantly predicted by the independent variable, and (c) in an equation with both the mediator and independent 
variable, the independent variable should have no effect and/or be significantly reduced, while the mediator should 
significantly predict the dependent variable. 
7 This 3-way interaction satisfies Baron & Kenny’s (1986) first criterion of mediated moderation. 
8 These models tests Baron & Kenny’s (1986) second criterion of mediated-moderation. 
9 The fully saturated models test Baron & Kenny’s (1986) third criterion of mediated-moderation. 
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identification interaction, since the importance ratings are predicted by the 3-way interaction and 
reduce its effect on support for the rally (see Columns C and D of Table 4). Substantively, this 
means that the identity matching effect is conveyed by the relative importance attached to public 
order values. These results suggest that the psychological process by which identity matching occurs 
is quite similar to the processes documented in previous framing research (e.g., Druckman and 
Nelson, 2003; Nelson et al., 1997). 
 
Experiment 2: Two-Sided Information Flows 
As we noted already, one of the criticisms of standard framing studies is their lack of 
external validity. Only recently have scholars begun to explore the effects of competitive frames, 
often finding that exposure to multiple sides of a debate reduce framing effects (Brewer, 2003; 
Brewer and Gross, 2005; Druckman, 2004; Druckman and Nelson, 2003; Sniderman and Theriault, 
2004). What remains unclear, however, is whether this “cancellation effect” would occur in the 
presence of source cues and identity matching. To answer this question, we turn to the data from 
Experiment 2, in which participants were exposed to both free-speech and public-order frames but 
from different ideological sources. 
Recall that we assigned participants to one of two competitive frame conditions (frame-
source: free speech-liberal source and public order-conservative source or public order-liberal source 
and free speech-conservative source). Now we are primarily interested in the competitive frame X 
participant ideology interaction. To examine the effects of the competitive frames with source cues on 
attitudes toward the KKK rally, we regressed support for the KKK rally on the crucial 2-way 
interaction, as well as its lower-order constituent terms and a set of control variables. The analysis 
yielded a non-significant 2-way interaction (B = 0.30, SE = 0.20, n.s.), which appears to replicate the 
“cancellation effect” discovered by other scholars (e.g., Sniderman and Theriault, 2004). In addition, 
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we found similar nonsignificant findings for an ordered logit model of the 4-point general tolerance 
dependent variable on the 2-way interaction (including main effects and controls, B = 0.23, SE = 
1.09, n.s.).10 In sum, we failed to observe a framing effect even when a clear position was taken by 
liberals and conservatives in the debate. 
It is conceivable, however, that the relative importance attached to values of free speech or 
public order vary as a function of source cue matching effects. To test this possibility, we regressed 
each of the two value importance items on the competitive frame X ideological identification interaction, its 
lower-order constituent terms, and a set of controls. Here, we do find a significant 2-way interaction 
for public order values (B = -0.26, SE=0.12, p<0.05) but not quite for free speech values (B = 0.27, 
SE=0.19, n.s.). To further explore this interaction, we calculated predicted values of endorsing the 
public order values by experimental condition and ideological identification. 
For subjects who strongly identify with liberals, public order considerations were clearly 
rated as important to the decision of whether to support the KKK rally request, and source cues 
signaled that greater weight should be placed on this particular value (MeanLFS-CPO = 0.74, SELFS-CPO= 
0.05; MeanLPO-CFS = 0.87 SELPO-CFS= 0.05; t = 2.28, p<0.05).
11 Similarly, our strong conservative 
identifiers also demonstrated that the public order value importance ratings are moderated by source 
cues. For instance, they show a 0.14 point difference in ratings of how important public order values 
are when presented by a conservative versus liberal source (MeanLPO-CFS = 0.69, SELFS-CPO= 0.07; 
MeanLFS-CPO = 0.83 SELPO-CFS= 0.06; t = 1.84, p<0.10). 
Now if we substitute the standard 7-point NES measure of ideology as our variable for 
identification with the message source, we find evidence that cues moderate ratings of value 
importance for both free speech and public order values. For strong liberals, this amounts to a 0.14 
                                                 
10 We find no differences when we substitute the 7-point NES ideology item as a measure of ideological identification 
for the frame-source X identification interaction, B = 0.16, SE=0.18, n.s. Likewise we report null results for the ordered logit 
using the substituted measure of ideological identification, Ƣ = 0.47, SE=0.97, n.s. 
11 L = Liberal; C = Conservative; FS = Free Speech; PO = Public Order. 
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point difference for free speech values when a liberal source presents the free speech vs. public 
order frame, regardless of the presence of the competitive frame (MeanLFS-CPO = 0.59, SELFS-CPO= 
0.07; MeanLPO-CFS = 0.44 SELPO-CFS= 0.07; t = 1.84, p<0.10).
12 Strong conservative identifiers also 
seem receptive to the values being expressed by conservative sources in our competitive frames, as 
they rated the importance of free speech values by 0.29 points higher when a conservative source 
presented the free speech frame compared to when the liberal presented the same information 
(MeanLFS-CPO = 0.57, SELFS-CPO= 0.09; MeanLPO-CFS = 0.86 SELPO-CFS= 0.10; t = 2.59, p<0.01). For public 
order value importance ratings, these source effects are present for our liberal and conservative 
identifiers. For instance, strongly identified liberals indicated a difference in ratings of the 
importance of public order values of 0.11 points (MeanLFS-CPO = 0.76 SELFS-CPO= 0.04; MeanLPO-CFS = 
0.86 SELPO-CFS= 0.05; t = 2.14, p<0.05). Interestingly, we did not find any significant differences for 
non-identifiers across competitive frame conditions for ratings of both free speech values (B = 0.02, 
SE = 0.04, n.s.) and public order values (B = 0.02, SE = 0.03, n.s.). 
While source cues do not resonate as heavily with ideologues exposed to two-sided 
information flows (relative to one-sided flows), these cues did influence the relative weights attached 
to free-speech versus public-order considerations. We believe that this is still an important, albeit 
exploratory, finding. Although competing frames may attenuate the effect of the frame on specific 
attitudes (i.e., they appear to “cancel” each other out), they can still influence the importance 
attached to a particular consideration. As Brewer and Gross (2005) note, one reason why 
competitive frames reduce net framing effects is that it is less clear to the individual which value to 
rely upon when forming an evaluation. If this is true, then the relative weight attached to free speech 
or public order values would be less influential in predicting support for the KKK rally following 
exposure to both sides. 
                                                 
12 L = Liberal; C = Conservative; FS = Free Speech; PO = Public Order. 
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One way to test this is by examining the simple correlations between tolerance and the value 
importance measures – free speech and public order- in the two experiments. The relation between 
the value and the issue should be muted when exposed to competing sides vis á vis the competitive 
frame experiment. In the asymmetric framing experiment, the zero-order correlation between 
support for the rally and the importance attached to public order was -0.39; whereas in the 
competitive experiment the correlation drops to -0.27. Similarly, the correlation between support for 
the rally and freedom of speech was 0.46 in the asymmetric framing experiment, yet was 0.36 in the 
competitive frame experiment. Overall, the relation between values and tolerance is reduced when 
exposed to two sides of the debate. 
Discussion 
 Although framing effects have been demonstrated in numerous experimental studies, critics 
have been quick to point out that these designs fail to mimic how individuals actually receive 
information and form opinions. Our study attempts to address this concern by providing message 
source information that is common in media reports about political issues. We provided evidence of 
an assimilation effect, such that an ideological match between message source and respondent 
facilitates framing effects, while a mismatch attenuates these effects. We observe this ideological 
matching effect regardless of the actual content of the issue frame or the ideology of the respondent. 
In other words, liberals were just as quick to oppose the KKK's request to hold a rally on campus as 
they were to support it, provided this political issue was framed by a liberal source. In contrast, a 
conservative speaker was unable to significantly shift liberals’ attitudes in any direction, despite using 
the exact same language of the liberal speaker. We interpret these results to mean that source 
information – particularly a group political label – is crucial to the process of framing. With an 
identity mismatch, issue frames are likely to elicit little response from a potential audience. 
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 Our findings fit well with Druckman’s (2001b) work on framing and source credibility. On 
the one hand, our research replicates Druckman’s finding that source credibility moderates framing 
effects. Clearly, receiving information from a source with the same ideological leanings will be 
viewed as more credible and trustworthy. On the other hand, we also view our findings as an 
important extension of Druckman’s claims, since we examine the general case of identity matching 
between message source and recipient. We also were able to demonstrate a novel moderating effect 
with something as basic to politics as an ideological label.13 By simply manipulating how “liberals” or 
“conservatives” framed the issue, we were able to show that this altered people’s specific attitudes 
toward the KKK rally, as well as the importance ascribed to general tolerance values.  
 While we observed strong identity source cue effects in the asymmetric framing experiment, 
these cues had a reduced effect in our competitive framing experiment. We included this experiment 
as a boundary test of the importance of source cues in issue framing. Recall that we expected to 
observe a polarizing effect, in which liberal respondents would readily accept the position of fellow 
liberals and dismiss the position taken by conservatives (and vice versa for conservative 
respondents). In our experiment, we found mixed evidence of identity matching. Although we did 
not find a significant framing effect when looking at attitudes, we did, however, find a matching 
effect for the importance attached to free speech and public order values among strong ideological 
identifiers using two measures of identification. Recall that this was not the case for our non-
identifiers in the sample, who indicated no significant difference in the importance attached to free 
speech and public order values across competitive conditions (i.e., the “cancellation effect”). 
                                                 
13
 Our findings are somewhat at odds with rational updating of partisan attachments (Gerber and Green, 1999). Our 
experiments suggest that participants do not adjust their identities from the position taken by liberals and 
conservatives; rather, participants adjust their positions depending on the position taken by liberals and 
conservatives. In short, our findings suggest that tolerance attitudes follow from identification, not the other way 
around. 
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The results from these experiments are informative for two reasons. First, our results suggest 
that individuals are susceptible to framing effects when exposed to a single consideration from an 
ideologically congruent source. One could simply conclude that relying on source information leads 
to less thoughtful and deliberative conclusions about political issues. In many respects, we believe 
that source information serves as a valuable tool, indicating where fellow group members (with 
similar beliefs) stand on important political issues. Second, our competing frame experiment 
demonstrates that individuals do not mindlessly follow fellow ideologues in all cases. In an even-
handed debate, in which liberals and conservatives simultaneously present equally valid but opposing 
concerns, our data show that ideological cues do not have as strong of an effect on political 
attitudes. In other words, source cue effects are weakened when the information stream is 
multifaceted. 
 While our analyses point to the importance of identity source cues, we feel obligated to note 
the limitations of our work. We relied on a relatively common issue in the framing literature – 
allowing the KKK to rally on campus– in order to demonstrate the bounds of framing effects when 
source information is provided. To this end, we provided participants with ideological cues, though 
it is unclear how additional source information would function in different framing scenarios. For 
instance, with issues that are more crystallized, such as abortion and other emotionally evocative 
issues, one might expect source cues to have less effect. Similarly, other source information may be 
of greater (or lesser) importance when considering difference political issues. Would partisan source 
cues outrival ideological source cues? How important is other source information such as race, 
religion, ethnicity, and gender? And, it is unclear how various source cues interact to eventuate 
attitude formation and change. Previous research has explored credibility (e.g., Druckman, 2001), 
while our research explores identification, but it remains to be determined how credibility and 
identification interact in framing research. We believe that by paying greater empirical attention to 
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the moderators of framing effects, we will be better able to understand how political issues are 
considered and under what conditions citizens rely on various types of information in formulating 
policy preferences.   
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Figure 1: Experiment 1 Framing Effect
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Experiment 1 Regression Results Testing Moderated Framing Effect 
 
Variables 
Support 
for KKK 
Rally 
Value Frame 
-0.10* 
(0.06) 
Source Ideology 
0.04 
(0.06) 
Ideological Identification 
0.02 
(0.21) 
Frame X Source 
-0.04 
(0.08) 
Frame X Identification 
0.43 
(0.28) 
Source X Identification 
0.38 
(0.26) 
Frame X Source X Identification 
-0.94*** 
(0.39) 
Female 
-0.05 
(0.04) 
Party ID 
-0.18 
(0.11) 
Asian 
-0.11** 
(0.05) 
Black 
-0.24*** 
(0.07) 
Hispanic 
-0.16** 
(0.08) 
Other Race (Non-White) 
-0.15** 
(0.06) 
 
Note: Table entries are regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Adjusted R2 = 
0.09; N = 268. * p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
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Table 2: Experiment 1 Predicted Mean Values Demonstrating Moderated Framing Effect 
 
Very Liberal Identification 
  Frame 
  Free Speech Public Order 
Source 
Liberal 0.48 0.20 
Conservative 0.36 0.43 
    
 
Mean Ideological Identification 
  Frame 
  Free Speech Public Order 
Source 
Liberal 0.48 0.38 
Conservative 0.52 0.38 
    
 
Very Conservative Identification 
  Frame 
  Free Speech Public Order 
Source 
Liberal 0.49 0.65 
Conservative 0.75 0.31 
 
Note: Cell entries are predicted mean levels of support for the KKK rally on campus, where the 
dependent variable is coded so that higher values indicate greater levels of support (and tolerance). 
Adjusted R2 = 0.09; N = 268. 
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Table 3: Experiment 1 Ordered Logit Results for General Tolerance Scale 
 
Variables 
General 
Tolerance 
Value Frame 
-0.30* 
(0.33) 
Source Ideology 
0.13 
(0.32) 
Ideological Identification 
-1.13 
(1.15) 
Frame X Source 
-0.02 
(0.45) 
Frame X Identification 
2.19 
(1.57) 
Source X Identification 
2.86 
(1.45) 
Frame X Source X Identification 
-6.22*** 
(2.17) 
Female 
-0.27 
(0.24) 
Party ID 
-0.52 
(0.60) 
Asian 
-0.36 
(0.30) 
Black 
-0.34 
(0.40) 
Hispanic 
-0.51 
(0.42) 
Other Race (Non-White) 
-0.58 
(0.36) 
Cut 1 
-1.76 
(0.30) 
Cut 2 
-0.61 
(0.28) 
Cut 3 
0.40 
(0.28) 
 
 
Note: Table entries are ordered logit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The 
dependent variable measures general tolerance and is composed of a 4-item scale (recoded from 0 
to 1), where higher values indicate greater levels of tolerance. N=265.  * p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p 
< 0.01. 
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Table 4: Experiment 1 Models Testing Mediated Moderation. 
 
 Free Speech Models Public Order Models 
Variables 
(a) 
Value 
Importance
(b) 
Support for 
the Rally 
(c) 
Value 
Importance 
(d) 
Support for 
the Rally 
Value Frame 
-0.06 
(0.06) 
-0.08 
(0.06) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
-0.12** 
(0.05) 
Source Ideology 
0.00 
(0.05) 
0.04 
(0.05) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.05) 
Ideological Identification 
0.13 
(0.20) 
-0.03 
(0.20) 
-0.21 
(0.13) 
-0.13 
(0.20) 
Frame X Source 
0.04 
(0.08) 
-0.05 
(0.08) 
0.09 
(0.05) 
0.02 
(0.07) 
Frame X Identification 
-0.06 
(0.27) 
0.45* 
(0.27) 
-0.14 
(0.17) 
0.33 
(0.26) 
Source X Identification 
-0.01 
(0.25) 
0.38 
(0.25) 
-0.10 
(0.16) 
0.31 
(0.24) 
Frame X Source X Identification 
0.08 
(0.37) 
-0.93** 
(0.37) 
0.50** 
(0.24) 
-0.57 
(0.36) 
Free Speech Value Importance -- 
0.32*** 
(0.06) 
-- -- 
Public Order Value Importance -- -- -- 
-0.67*** 
(0.09) 
Female 
-0.09** 
(0.04) 
-0.21 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
Party ID 
-0.05 
(0.10) 
-0.16 
(0.11) 
0.04 
(0.07) 
-0.14 
(0.10) 
Asian 
0.03 
(0.05) 
-0.12** 
(0.05) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.13*** 
(0.05) 
Black 
-0.15** 
(0.07) 
-0.20*** 
(0.07) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
-0.21*** 
(0.07) 
Hispanic 
0.05 
(0.08) 
-0.18** 
(0.08) 
0.05 
(0.05) 
-0.13* 
(0.07) 
Other Race (Non-White) 
-0.09** 
(0.06) 
-0.12** 
(0.06) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.15*** 
(0.06) 
Constant 
0.65*** 
(0.05) 
0.27*** 
(0.06) 
0.88*** 
(0.03) 
1.07*** 
(0.09) 
Adjusted-R2 0.03 0.17 0.05 0.24 
Sobel-Statistic -- 
0.02 
(0.12) 
-- 
-0.33** 
(0.17) 
 
Note: Table entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The value importance 
measures are coded from 0 (“completely unimportant”) to 1 (“extremely important”). N=267. 
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
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APPENDIX 
 
1. Stimulus Materials 
 
Free Speech Headline 
Headline: Liberals/Conservatives Say Ku Klux Klan Tests Stony Brook’s Commitment to Free 
Speech 
 
Public Order Headline 
Headline: Liberals/Conservatives Concerned about Safety at Ku Klux Klan Rally 
 
Introductory Paragraph (Same for all respondents) 
How far is Stony Brook University prepared to go to protect freedom of speech? The Ku Klux 
Klan has requested a permit to conduct a speech and rally on the Stony Brook campus during the 
Spring Semester of 2006. Officials and administrators will decide whether to approve or deny the 
request in January. 
 
Numerous courts have ruled that the U.S. Constitution ensures that the Klan has the right to 
speak and hold rallies on public grounds, and that individuals have the right to hear the Klan’s 
message if they are interested. Many of the Klan’s appearances around New York have been 
marked by violent clashes between Klan supporters and counterdemonstrators who show up to 
protest the Klan’s racist activities. In one confrontation last July in Buffalo, New York, several 
bystanders were injured by rocks thrown by Klan supporters and protesters. Usually, a large 
police force is needed to control the crowds. 
 
Free Speech Frame 
Opinion about the speech and rally is mixed. Liberals/Conservatives worry about the rally, but 
support the group’s right to speak. One Liberal/Conservative remarked “I hate the Klan, but 
they have the right to speak, and people have the right to hear them if they want to. We may 
have some concerns about the rally, but the right to speak and hear what you want takes 
precedence over our fears about what could happen.” 
 
Public Order Frame 
Opinion about the speech and rally is mixed. Liberals/Conservatives have expressed great 
concern about campus safety and security during a Klan rally. One Liberal/Conservative 
remarked, “Freedom of speech is important, but so is the safety of the Stony Brook community 
and the security of  the campus. Considering the violence at past KKK rallies, I don’t think the 
University has an obligation to allow this to go on. Safety must be our top priority.” 
 
Note: Stimulus materials taken from Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley (1997). The underlined headings were not presented to 
subjects, nor was any of the text in bold. For Experiment 1, subjects were randomly assigned one headline and value frame, along 
with a liberal or conservative speaker. For Experiment 2 (counterframing), subjects received both frames and the headline: 
“Liberals and Conservatives Disagree about Ku Klux Klan Rally at Stony Brook University.” 
 
 
2. Attitude toward Allowing the KKK Rally Item 
Do you think Stony Brook University should or should not allow the Ku Klux Klan to hold a rally on this 
campus? 
 Definitely Should          Definitely Should NOT 
      Be Allowed       Be Allowed 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
WHO SAID WHAT? 
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3. General Tolerance Items 
Free speech should be granted: 
    only to people who are willing to grant the same rights of free speech to   
   everyone else. 
    to everyone regardless of how intolerant they are of other people’s opinions. 
 
Should groups like the Nazis be allowed to appear on public television to state their views? 
    No, because they would offend certain racial or religious groups. 
    Yes, should be allowed no matter who is offended. 
 
A group that wants to buy advertising space in a newspaper to advocate war against another country: 
    should be turned down by the newspaper. 
    should have as much right to buy advertising space as a group 
   that favors world peace. 
 
*Note: All of these questions appeared after the main framing manipulation; however, the order of these questions differed in the 
actual survey. 
 
 
 
